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Abstract
Behavioral genetic (BG) research has yielded many important discoveries about the origins of human behavior, but offers 
little insight into how we might improve outcomes. We posit that this gap in our knowledge base stems in part from the epi-
demiologic nature of BG research questions. Namely, BG studies focus on understanding etiology as it currently exists, rather 
than etiology in environments that could exist but do not as of yet (e.g., etiology following an intervention). Put another way, 
they focus exclusively on the etiology of “what is” rather than “what could be”. The current paper discusses various aspects 
of this field-wide methodological reality, and offers a way to overcome it by demonstrating how behavioral geneticists can 
incorporate an experimental approach into their work. We outline an ongoing study that embeds a randomized intervention 
within a twin design, connecting “what is” and “what could be” for the first time. We then lay out a more general framework 
for a new field—experimental BGs—which has the potential to advance both scientific inquiry and related philosophical 
discussions.
Keywords G×E · Randomized intervention · Twin study
Introduction
Behavioral genetic (BG) research has yielded a number of 
important discoveries about human behavior that have been 
not only provocative and interesting, but also surprising. 
One of the most surprising is that virtually all human traits 
are heritable, usually substantially so (Turkheimer 2000). 
Nevertheless, the promise of BG research has not yet been 
fulfilled. For example, although it is now clear that many 
psychological disorders are highly heritable, BG research 
has had little impact on the diagnosis and treatment of these 
disorders. Furthermore, the implications of findings from 
BG research for fundamental philosophical questions about 
human nature are still unclear. These critical gaps in BG 
research were the impetus for the Genetics and Human 
Agency (GHA) Project, a recent initiative by the John Tem-
pleton Foundation. This project brings together scholars 
from both empirical and philosophical traditions, with the 
ultimate aim of exploring both practical and philosophi-
cal implications of BG research (for more information, see 
http://www.genet icshu manag ency.org/about /).
Our research group postulates that these gaps in BG 
research relate to the fundamentally epidemiologic nature 
of BG research methods. More specifically, BG studies focus 
on understanding etiology as it currently exists, rather than 
etiology in environments that could exist. To put it another 
way, BG research focuses on the etiology of what is rather 
than what could be. As a consequence, BG research provides 
virtually no information about how we might intervene to 
change behavior, or how interventions might alter etiology 
(Lewontin 1974).
This reality is, in many ways, intentional. The overarching 
goal of BG research is to understand the origins of individ-
ual differences in psychological traits and other character-
istics. In other words, behavioral geneticists aim to answer 
the question, “Why are people different?” (Plomin 1990). 
A truly experimental approach to answering this question, 
which would require cloning humans and randomly assign-
ing them to different rearing environments, is both ethically 
reprehensible and infeasible. Thus, behavioral geneticists 
cleverly leveraged an “experiment of nature” to tease apart 
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genetic and environmental influences on naturally-occurring 
individual differences (Plomin 1990). In this so-called ‘natu-
ral experiment’, twin siblings have been compared across 
zygosity (monozygotic versus dizygotic) to estimate the 
various contributions to the variance in a given phenotype, 
including additive genetic variance (A), shared environmen-
tal variance (C), and nonshared environmental variance (E). 
Behavioral geneticists have also compared adoptive sibling 
similarity to biological sibling similarity to estimate these 
proportions of variance.
Decades of twin and adoption research have since yielded 
what are now known as the “three laws” of BG (Turkheimer 
2000), which can be expressed in terms of A, C, and E as 
described above. The first law states that all behavioral traits 
demonstrate A, the second law that A is larger than C (in 
adulthood), and the third law that all traits demonstrate sub-
stantial E. While epidemiological research in the ACE tradi-
tion has clearly advanced knowledge regarding the origins of 
human behavior, philosophers and other critics of BG have 
rightly observed that such work does not illuminate whether 
or how alternate environments (and perhaps most impor-
tantly, interventions) might change these origins (Kaplan 
2000; Lewontin 1974; Tabery 2014). To be sure, there has 
been a recent surge of interest in genotype-by-environment 
interactions (G×E) (Caspi et al. 2002; Moffitt et al. 2006) 
and the ways in which etiology can be moderated by various 
environmental contexts (e.g., Burt 2015; Burt et al. 2016). 
This research provides clues about how interventions could 
alter etiology. However, extant G×E work is still limited 
to the examination of naturally-occurring environmental 
moderators that exist in the data, and does not meaningfully 
consider the counterfactual (i.e., what the etiology would be 
in an environment that could, but does not yet, exist, such 
as the one following a yet-to-be implemented intervention).
In short, BG seeks to identify the origins of human behav-
ior as it naturally occurs, but does not elucidate the ways in 
which these origins might change following interventions. 
We argue that, although this approach has borne a great deal 
of scientific insight to date, it also represents a fundamental 
limitation, in that it (1) limits our understanding of the full 
range of etiologies of a given condition, and (2) hamstrings 
our ability to meaningfully inform prevention and inter-
vention science. To move ahead, we need to consider what 
heritability estimates can and cannot tell us, with the goal 
of using that information to go beyond the field’s current 
epidemiological approach. In this article, we seek to do just 
this, outlining the relevant limitations of BG and identifying 
one promising path forward.
Limitations of BG research
Philosophers and scientists have long debated the uses 
and limitations of heritability estimates, and of twin and 
adoption designs more generally (Downes 2017; Longino 
2013; Sesardic 2005). A pivotal moment in this debate was 
Lewontin’s (1974) article arguing that heritability estimates 
are both population- and trait-relative, and thus cannot be 
generalized beyond the specific range of environments 
lived by the participants. The classic illustration of this 
point, which has been called the “locality problem,” is phe-
nylketonuria (PKU), a condition that causes buildup of the 
amino acid phenylalanine in the body and which leads to 
severe intellectual disability, psychological disorders, and 
other problems if left untreated (Wahlsten 1997). PKU is 
100% heritable, but the phenotypic effects of PKU can be 
almost eliminated through changes in diet (Wahlsten 1997). 
The reason is that the heritability estimate reflects typical 
environments (i.e., diets that include phenylalanine, which 
is present in most foods) rather than the phenotypic effects 
in alternate environments that exist only after intervention 
(i.e., diets without phenylalanine).
A further problem with BG research is the level of analy-
sis problem and the related ‘black box problem’ (Plomin 
et al. 2013). Heritability estimates are estimates of variance, 
and as such, reveal the overall origins of individual differ-
ences around the mean. They are thus population-level sta-
tistics, and accordingly, do not apply to any one individual 
(note that this problem is not unique to the field of BG). 
What’s more, while latent genetic variance reflects statisti-
cal signals from susceptibility loci (Kendler 2005), it reveals 
nothing about the number or location of genes involved, just 
as estimates of shared and nonshared environmental influ-
ences do not reveal specific environmental experiences that 
give rise to these influences (Turkheimer 2004). Although 
the descriptive nature of the estimated variance components 
is clearly a significant limitation of traditional BG research, 
others have defended the utility of heritability estimates, 
pointing out that in cases where there is little-to-no gene-
environment interplay, such estimates can provide us with 
important information about the causal relationship between 
genetic variance and phenotypic variance (Sesardic 2005; 
Tal 2009). Namely, in this scenario, heritability estimates 
reveal the probability that genes have a larger effect than the 
environment when it comes to explaining individual varia-
tion for a particular trait (Tal 2009).
Understanding this level-of-analysis distinction between 
estimating variance in a population on the one hand, and 
identifying specific causal factors on the other hand, is the 
key to explaining an apparent paradox: even highly herit-
able traits can be responsive to environmental interventions 
(Dickens and Flynn 2001; Sauce and Matzel 2018). This 
paradox, we argue, only seems like a paradox if one assumes 
that highly heritable traits are immutable—or, at least, would 
require drastic and long-lasting interventions to change. Yet, 
there is evidence that traits with relatively high heritabil-
ity estimates can be altered through both intensive and less 
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intensive environmental interventions. As one example, 
academic achievement is both stable and highly heritable 
(60+%) (Bartels et al. 2002), and yet this phenotype has 
been shown in randomized experiments to be affected by 
a variety of factors, including class size (Nye et al. 2000), 
proportion of female students in the classroom (Whitmore 
2005), school quality (Hastings and Weinstein 2008), and, 
in the case of more impoverished students, academic mind-
set or beliefs about whether intelligence is fixed or can be 
improved with effort (Dweck and Leggett 1988).
Before proceeding, we need to acknowledge two major 
ways in which BG has already attempted to move beyond 
simple heritability estimates and the limitations they impose 
on interpretation: biometric G×E studies and molecular 
genetic studies. Biometric G×E studies center on environ-
mental moderation of latent or inferred genetic risk, calcu-
lated via comparisons of resemblance among relatives with 
varying degrees of genetic similarity (Purcell 2002). And, 
although biometric G×E methods are now are well estab-
lished, it should be noted that biometric G×E methods do 
challenge two longstanding assumptions in BG: (1) that the 
genetic portion of variance is comprised solely of additive 
genetic effects, and (2) that G×Es do not contribute to the 
phenotype in question (for an in-depth historical and philo-
sophical analysis of G×E research, see Tabery 2014). Recent 
work indicates that, for many phenotypes, the genetic por-
tion of variance is very likely to reflect both gene–environ-
ment interplay and simple additive genetic effects (Moffitt 
et al. 2006). Biometric G×E studies thus represent a major 
advance for the field of BG. Even so (and as noted earlier), 
they fail to solve the core epidemiological challenge to tra-
ditional BG, in that they are still limited to observations of 
naturally occurring variance. In other words, like traditional 
heritability estimates, biometric G×E studies are fundamen-
tally limited to evaluating what is rather than what could be.
Molecular genetic analyses also resolve several of the pit-
falls inherent to traditional BG, in large part by circumvent-
ing the descriptive nature of latent genetic risk. In molecu-
lar analyses, genetic risk is directly measured rather than 
inferred; accordingly, this approach has far more promise 
for elucidating underlying biological processes. Neverthe-
less, it has become abundantly clear from this research that 
specific genes have limited explanatory power. Effect sizes 
for individual genetic contributions to psychopathology have 
thus far been found to range from essentially zero to tiny, 
explaining well under 1% of the variance. Conducting G×E 
research at the level of any one specific gene (or small set of 
genes) thus has very limited utility for most psychiatric out-
comes. Even when the entire genome is examined, molecular 
genetic contributions typically explain well under 50% of 
the genetic variance in any given trait. Many have referred 
to this as the “missing heritability” problem (Turkheimer 
2011). Much like the apparent paradox of highly heritable 
but malleable traits, the missing heritability problem is only 
surprising if one assumes that high heritability estimates 
represent primarily additive genetic effects (rather than 
G×E). However, there is no definitive evidence that highly 
heritable traits are more likely to be directly and additively 
influenced by genes. For example, heritability estimates for 
breast cancer are only around 27% (Lichtenstein et al. 2000; 
Möller et al. 2016), yet particular gene variants have been 
identified that are highly predictive of breast cancer for the 
individuals who have them (e.g., BRCA1 and BRCA1). One 
possible reason for this discrepancy between the size of the 
heritability estimate and the ability to identify influential 
genes is that at least some of the genes associated with 
breast cancer are highly penetrant (i.e., the presence of a 
gene variant is highly associated with the development of 
the phenotype), which may not be the case for more complex 
behavioral traits like IQ. Regardless, the molecular approach 
is currently limited in terms of its ability to enhance our 
understanding of what could be.
In sum, current BG approaches are not able to uncover the 
etiology of individual differences in the context of environ-
ments that do not (yet) exist. We contend that overcoming 
this methodological reality will provide invaluable insights 
in BG research going forward. These include (1) illuminat-
ing how novel environments influence a given trait’s eti-
ology, (2) detailing how specific interventions can change 
behavior, and (3) allowing scientists to make stronger causal 
inferences about the origins of individual differences in 
behavior. Put another way, it is well-nigh time for BG to go 
experimental.
Experimental BG
In a controlled psychological experiment, an independent 
variable (IV; typically an environmental or situational factor) 
is manipulated by the researcher to determine its effect on a 
dependent variable (DV; typically the participants’ behav-
ior), holding other factors constant. There are two variants 
of this design. In the between-subjects design, each partici-
pant is assigned to a group representing one level of the 
IV (e.g., drug or placebo). The assignment of participants 
to conditions is randomized to control for the influence of 
confounding variables on the DV (e.g., preexisting health 
in a drug study)—that is, to ensure that these factors have 
about the same effect on the DV across groups. By contrast, 
in the within-subjects design, each participant is exposed to 
each level of the IV, and thus serves as their own control for 
confounding variables. In either design, casual inferences are 
permitted, because the effect of the IV on the DV presum-
ably reflects the variable in question and not other variables.
Not surprisingly, then, experiments are at the heart of 
contemporary philosophical accounts of causation. Phi-
losophers of science offer thoughtful and rich accounts of 
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causation and what sorts of evidence scientists need to be 
able to make well-supported causal inferences. Many of 
these theories conceptualize causal variables in terms of 
their ability to manipulate particular effects (Woodward 
2016). Interventions are accordingly seen as one of the best 
ways to determine a causal relationship between variables. 
Put another way, experiments are an ideal vehicle for evalu-
ating the ‘what could be’ counterfactual for the DV.
What might experiments look like within the context of 
BG? In the next section of this article, we provide an illus-
trative example by describing a recently funded study that 
combines BG twin methods with a between-subjects experi-
ment. The goal of this ongoing experiment is to investigate 
whether and how a brief intervention designed to change 
people’s beliefs about the nature of intelligence (i.e., mind-
set) alters the etiology of phenotypes related to academic 
achievement (e.g., locus of control, challenge-seeking 
behavior, grit, and IQ).
An experimental twin study
Rationale for specific phenotypes chosen
Children acquire academic skills at markedly different rates, 
with some children developing much more rapidly than oth-
ers. As a case in point, while many high school students pro-
gress no further than algebra, others make it through geom-
etry and trigonometry, and still others through advanced 
placement calculus courses, allowing them to “place out” 
of college mathematics courses. These individual differences 
in academic achievement can have enormous consequences 
later in life for occupational attainment and other outcomes.
What might account for this striking variability in aca-
demic achievement? A major part of the answer, at least 
in existing environments, appears to be general cognitive 
ability (“g”), which is typically indexed via overall IQ. In 
one 5-year prospective study of over 70,000 children (Deary 
et al. 2007), the correlation between childhood IQ and later 
academic achievement was .81. This very strong association 
has clear implications for etiology, since g evidences herit-
ability estimates upwards of 60 or 70% (Plomin et al. 2013). 
Academic achievement during adolescence is similarly herit-
able, with typical heritability estimates hovering around 60% 
(Bartels et al. 2002).
At the same time, there is growing evidence that, at least 
in students from disadvantaged contexts, mindset also pre-
dicts academic achievement, albeit far less than IQ does 
(Dweck and Leggett 1988; Sisk et al. 2018). Mindset refers 
to a person’s beliefs about whether their abilities are fixed 
(innate and unchanging) or malleable (modifiable through 
effort). Prior work (Dweck 2006) has demonstrated that 
those who endorse a growth mindset are more likely to 
tackle difficult tasks than those with a fixed mindset, since 
growth-minded individuals see difficult tasks as an oppor-
tunity to learn while fixed-minded individuals see them 
as something to avoid (lest they appear ‘simpleminded’). 
People with a growth mindset are also more likely to view 
cognitive ability as a product of effort and environmental 
opportunity, whereas those with a fixed mindset view cogni-
tive abilities as immutable and genetic in origin.
What makes these results all the more interesting is 
that growth mindsets can be induced in some people using 
interventions as brief as 10 min, with significant, albeit 
small, consequences for later academic performance (Sisk 
et al. 2018). As an example, a recent pair of meta-analyses 
assessed the relationship between mindset and academic 
achievement, one of which evaluated experimental effects 
of growth mindset inductions on achievement (Sisk et al. 
2018). They found a small but significant effect of growth 
mindset inductions on academic achievement, d̄ = 0.08, 95% 
(CI) = [0.02, 0.14], p = .01. These growth mindset inter-
ventions were particularly effective for students from low 
socioeconomic status (SES; d = 0.34, 95% CI [0.07, 0.62], 
p = .013) and for students who were academically high-
risk (d = 0.19, 95% CI [0.02, 0.36], p = .031). Such find-
ings have been interpreted to suggest that, in much the way 
that environmental influences have been shown to be more 
important to the etiology of IQ in lower SES contexts as 
compared to higher SES contexts (Tucker-Drob and Bates 
2016; Turkheimer et al. 2003), environmental influences 
(perhaps including the growth mindset induction) may be 
more important to academic achievement in more disadvan-
taged groups.
Knowledge to be gained through experimental BG
Cumulative evidence thus indicates that academic achieve-
ment is both quite heritable and can be improved in some 
students following a brief online intervention. In our ongo-
ing experimental BG study, we are addressing these apparent 
inconsistencies, employing a novel and state-of-the-science 
methodologic design that integrates standard BG methods 
with randomized experimental methods to connect what 
is with what could be. After completing baseline tests of 
mindset, locus of control, grit, and cognitive ability, twins 
are randomly assigned to complete either a growth mindset 
induction or a control task. They then repeat all measures a 
second time. Analyses will compare heritability estimates, 
as well as estimates of shared and nonshared environmen-
tal variance, before and after the intervention as well as 
across experimental and control conditions, allowing us to 
directly evaluate the role of our brief intervention in alter-
ing etiology.
Below, we discuss our experimental twin study design 
in detail, the very first of its kind (the only other BG 
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intervention study conducted to date (Haworth et al. 2016) 
did not randomize the assignment of participants to condi-
tions). We then discuss the expectations for outcomes in 
terms of changes to ACE components, as well as what those 
possible outcomes would mean for our understanding of the 
etiology of human behavior.
Design and procedure
We are currently recruiting early-to-mid adolescent twin 
pairs (50% monozygotic, 50% dizygotic) for a ~ 1 h online 
assessment (using Qualtrics). Twin pairs are randomly 
assigned to the experimental or control conditions using the 
following targets: 1/3 will be assigned to the control–control 
condition (in which both twins are assigned to the active 
control), 1/3 will be assigned to the growth–growth condi-
tion (in which both twins are assigned to the growth condi-
tion), and 1/3 will be assigned to the control–growth condi-
tion (in which one twin is assigned to the growth condition 
and the other to the control condition).
The assessment itself has three phases (see Table 1). In 
Phase 1, we ask all participants to complete measures of (a) 
mindset and the conceptually related constructs of grit and 
locus of control, (b) challenge-seeking behavior, as exam-
ined in Yeager et al. (2016; choosing hard versus easy math 
problems), and (c) cognitive ability (verbal and non-verbal 
reasoning ability). In Phase 2, we experimentally manipulate 
mindset using a state-of-the-art mindset induction paradigm 
developed specifically for early-to-mid adolescents (Yeager 
et al. 2016). The two conditions differ in terms of the content 
presented to participants. In the growth mindset condition, 
participants are presented with content suggesting that intel-
ligence develops from stimulating environments and can be 
improved with effort [e.g., “the brain is like a muscle—it 
gets stronger (and smarter) when you exercise it”]. In the 
active control condition, participants are presented with 
content that reviews basic findings about the human brain 
but is neutral with respect to the influence of effort on intel-
ligence (e.g., “the parietal lobe is where the brain interprets 
the sense of touch”). In Phase 3, all participants complete the 
aforementioned measures of mindset, grit, cognitive ability, 
and challenge-seeking behaviors a second time. They are 
then be debriefed regarding the intervention (i.e., we clarify 
that both genes and environments contribute to intelligence).
Planned analyses
We expect de novo (Phase 1) mindset, grit, locus of con-
trol, challenge-seeking behavior, and cognitively ability 
to emerge as moderately-to-highly heritable (Tucker-Drob 
et al. 2016). We also expect that these Phase 1 heritabili-
ties will not vary across experimental conditions, given that 
participants are randomly assigned to these conditions and 
have yet to receive the intervention. We do not have any 
a priori expectations for changes in etiology following the 
intervention (i.e., Phase 3), as there is no research to guide 
hypotheses. However, we do lay out the various possibilities 
for changes in components of variance and discuss possible 
interpretations of potential outcomes in the next section. We 
will specifically explore whether and how these genetic and 
environmental influences change from Phase 1 to 3, sepa-
rately for those in the growth-mindset and active control 
conditions.
Analyses will be conducted as follows: We will first 
confirm that the etiologies of mindset, grit, locus of con-
trol,  challenge-seeking behavior, and cognitive ability, 
respectively, do not vary across the two intervention groups 
de novo (i.e., Phase 1) via Purcell’s univariate G×E model 
(Purcell 2002). This is the most appropriate and powerful 
G×E model when there is no possibility of gene–environ-
ment correlations (rGE) between the moderator and the 
outcome (van der Sluis et al. 2012), which is necessarily 
the case in our study given the use of random assignment. 
This analysis serves as an etiologic check on our randomi-
zation process. We will then repeat these analyses in those 
data collected after the mindset intervention (i.e., Phase 3), 
exploring whether the intervention altered etiology. We will 
then elaborate on the above results using a simple extension 
of the bivariate G×E model, estimating genetic and envi-
ronmental similarity across Phases 1 and 3 via genetic and 
environmental correlations.
Table 1  Study design
Condition is assigned so as to elicit the following configuration of twin pairs: a third will be assigned to the control–control condition, in which 
both twins are assigned to the active control. A third will be assigned to the growth–growth condition, in which both twins are assigned to the 
growth condition. The final third will be assigned to the control–growth condition, in which one twin is assigned to the growth condition and the 
other to the control condition. The latter allows us to confirm condition-induced changes at the level of the individual twin, and also allows for 
the possible use of the co-twin control model in the future
Condition Phase 1: pre-test Phase 2: intervention Phase 3: post-test
Experimental (growth) group Complete measures Learn that intelligence develops from stimulating envi-
ronments and can be improved with effort
Complete measures




The presence of any etiologic change from Phase 1 to Phase 
3 would be interesting, in that it would point to etiologic 
instability over the course of an hour. Extant data have 
already highlighted the instability of non-shared environ-
mental influences in particular over lags as short as a few 
minutes (Burt et al. 2015). However, the Burt et al. (2015) 
study still captures etiology as it is, not as it could be. In 
this light, etiologic change specifically in response to the 
growth mindset intervention, relative to both the individual’s 
baseline and to those in the active control condition, would 
be quite meaningful. Indeed, our study would be the first 
ever to identify experimentally-induced changes in etiology 
directly in response to a randomly-assigned intervention (to 
our knowledge). Moreover, our findings would represent a 
proof-of-concept for the idea that interventions need not be 
particularly long and intense to accomplish etiologic change. 
Such findings would have major implications for our con-
ceptual understanding of G×E, and for our philosophical 
understanding of BG results. The absence of etiologic mod-
eration would have similarly important (though obviously 
different) implications for these same questions, though of 
course would not rule out the possibility that other brief 
interventions could alter etiology.
Should there be relevant etiologic change in response to 
the growth mindset intervention (see Table 2), however, we 
further suggest that the specific pattern of etiologic change 
may also be theoretically and practically meaningful (assum-
ing, as before, that similar change is not observed in the 
active control condition). This interpretation is, to a consid-
erable extent, predicated on the positive or negative valence 
of both the environmental moderator and the outcome. In 
our case, the growth mindset induction appears to function 
as a protective or positively valenced environmental manipu-
lation (e.g., it improves grades). Achievement outcomes are 
similarly positively valenced, in that we nearly always want 
to maximize these outcomes.
Given the valence structure embedded in our study, there 
are two ready-made interpretive frameworks: bioecological 
G×E and environmental main effects. Under the bioecologi-
cal model, deleterious environments would amplify shared 
environmental influences, whereas genetic influences would 
be more important under protective environmental conditions. 
In this case, the model would specifically predict absolute (or 
unstandardized) decreases in environmental influences with 
exposure to protective environments (the growth mindset). 
Genetic influences would simultaneously be expected to 
increase (as is the case with Turkheimer’s seminal SES and 
IQ findings). One key caveat, however, is that the change in 
genetic influences may only be observable when examined 
relative to the environmental moderation (i.e., via stand-
ardized estimates): “unlike in a diathesis-stress model, the 
environmental (risk) factor in a bioecological interaction does 
not necessarily act on the same biological substrate as the 
genetic risk factors. Instead, it may just allow those genetic risk 
factors to account for more of the variance in outcome, because 
environmental risk factors that affect that outcome have been 
minimized” (Pennington et al. 2009, p. 80). In short, increases 
in standardized or unstandardized genetic influences on a given 
outcome following the growth mindset induction would likely 
be interpreted via the bioecological framework, particularly 
when accompanied by decreases in environmental influences, 
Table 2  Possible configurations of etiologic change following the 
growth mindset induction
BE stands for the bioecological model of G×E, and DE stands for 
environmental ‘direct effect’. A, C, and E stand for unstandardized 
(or absolute) additive genetic, shared environmental, and non-shared 
environmental variation, respectively. Because they are not standard-
ized, they do not sum to 100%, and so each variance component can 
increase or decrease simultaneously. An arrow pointing up indicates 
that the magnitude of variance increases following the intervention, 
whereas an arrow pointing down indicates that the magnitude of vari-
ance decreases. A dash indicates no change
**Strong evidence in favor of that interpretation
*Some evidence in favor of that interpretation
Possible configurations of unstandardized 
ACE
Interpretive framework
A C E BE DE




↑ ↓ – **
↑ ↓ ↓ **
↑ – ↓ **
↑ ↑ ↓ *
↑ ↓ ↑ *
↓ – – *
↓ ↑ – **
↓ ↑ ↑ **




↓ ↑ ↓ **
↓ ↓ ↑ *
– ↑ – **
– ↑ ↑ **
– – ↑ *
– ↓ – **
– ↓ ↓ **
– – ↓ *
– ↑ ↓ **
– ↓ ↑ *
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(Bronfenbrenner and Ceci 1994; Pennington et al. 2009), such 
that the growth mindset intervention enhanced genetic influ-
ences on achievement-related outcomes.
In sharp contrast, increases in environmental influences 
(especially shared) on a given outcome following the growth 
mindset induction, perhaps especially when accompanied by 
decreases in genetic influences, would likely be interpreted 
as something akin to an environmental ‘direct effect’. Put dif-
ferently, under this scenario, common exposure to the growth 
mindset intervention would increase twin similarity regardless 
of their level of genetic similarity. This would be very inter-
esting, in that direct or ‘main’ effects of the environment on a 
given outcome have not historically been considered a form 
of G×E (since G×E clearly implies a statistical interaction), 
and teases out the possible new insights we could gain from 
experimental BG.
The utility of the oft-discussed diathesis-stress G×E model 
is murkier here, in large part because in its original form, 
the model postulates that environmental risk experiences 
activate or increase genetic influences on psychopathology 
(i.e., a negatively-valenced moderator acting on a negatively-
valenced outcome). Although this model has been extended to 
positively-valenced moderators acting on negatively-valenced 
outcomes (e.g., prosocial peer affiliation appears to suppress 
genetic influences on youth antisocial behavior; Burt and 
Klump 2014), it is more difficult to extend it here, given that 
both the moderator and the outcome are positively valenced. 
With these caveats in mind, the diathesis-stress model might 
perhaps predict absolute decreases in genetic influences with 
exposure to the growth mindset induction, such that genetic 
influences would be more influential in the ‘riskier’ active 
control condition. There are no clear predictions for environ-
mental influences on the outcome in the diathesis-stress model 
(regardless of the valence of the environmental experience 
itself), so we do not anticipate any in our case either.
Discussion
Limitations
By merging experimental science into the twin study design, 
our first-of-its-kind experimental twin study will allow us to 
directly evaluate not only the etiology of what could be but 
also how this etiology changes relative to what is. Although 
poised to offer meaningful insights that are otherwise not 
accessible to BG, this novel design only partially remedies 
the other inherent limitations in traditional BG designs. 
Should there be evidence of etiologic moderation by the 
growth mindset intervention, it would necessarily point to 
an identified environmental influence (the intervention) on 
the phenotype (either directly or by altering the importance 
of genetic influences). Even so, the “black box problem” 
discussed above remains a significant limitation, and par-
ticularly so for the genetic component of variance. That is, 
it does not yield any information on the number or location 
of genes influencing the phenotype. And should the genetic 
correlation between Phases 1 and 3 be < 1.0, we will not 
gain any insight into the specific genes that contribute to the 
phenotype in one phase but not the other.
The experimental twin design also fails to address the 
level of analysis issue discussed above, in that results remain 
confined to the level of the population and would not apply 
to the individual. Critically, however, there are other itera-
tions of experimental BG that could more fully address both 
the level of analysis and the black box problems. One such 
design would involve examinations of epigenetic marks 
before and after a randomized intervention, an approach that 
would more clearly reveal specific epigenetic mechanisms 
of effect and move closer to applying results to the level of 
the individual. As already noted, however, molecular and 
epigenetic approaches each have limitations of their own, 
including issues of missing heritability and the inability to 
evaluate epigenetic alterations in the brain in living humans. 
The single best design, then, might incorporate both twin 
and more molecular approaches, allowing us to evaluate 
changes in genetic and environmental variance with the 
intervention and to identify specific epigenetic marks in the 
periphery. Future work should thus develop and refine inte-
grative experimental behavior genetic approaches.
Conclusions
The project described above represents (to our knowl-
edge) the very first randomized intervention conducted 
within a twin study design, providing an ideal platform 
for scientifically and philosophically rigorous advances 
in our philosophical and conceptual understandings of 
the etiology of human behavior, and in particular the con-
cepts of heritability and G×E. This innovation allows us 
to empirically address one of the core philosophical cri-
tiques of BG—namely that BG research describes only 
what is and not what could be. It will also allow us to 
simultaneously consider and empirically piece together the 
(seemingly opposed) concepts of heritability and malle-
ability, furthering our foundational understanding of the 
interplay between genetic influences and environmental 
experiences.
In these ways, the project should meaningfully con-
tribute to two important discussions in the philosophical 
literature. The first such discussion relates to the issue of 
causal inference in BG, and in particular the utility of her-
itability estimates for understanding relative influences on 
behavioral trait variation. Our study will clarify whether 
using randomized, controlled interventions enables us 
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to make different and/or more valid causal claims than 
epidemiological data, or whether the limitations of BG 
findings apply whenever one is studying population vari-
ation. The second discussion relates to the recent debate 
over the relationship of the human behavioral sciences 
to one another (i.e., Helen Longino’s pluralistic account 
which claims that the questions and methods in each sub-
field are sufficiently different so as to prevent integration; 
see Longino 2013). The current study will provide some 
insight into our ability to intentionally integrate, at least 
to some extent, the methods of different subfields, with 
corresponding implications for our understanding of the 
nature and relationship of different scientific disciplines.
Conceptually, the proposed study should further our 
foundational understanding of the interplay between 
genetic inf luences and environmental experiences. 
Implicit in much of the prior theorizing regarding G×E 
is that genetic influences are potent and stable, and are 
altered primarily in response to “major” environmental 
experiences. Philosophical work has not supported these 
assumptions (e.g., Lewontin 1974), but they have yet to 
be tested empirically. The proposed project will tackle 
these assumptions head on, and moreover, will do so in an 
experimental design immune to gene–environment corre-
lation (rGE) confounds (given our use of random assign-
ment), thus providing an ideal platform for scientifically 
and philosophically rigorous advances in our conceptu-
alization of G×E. We are excited to see where else this 
approach might lead.
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